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VIEW OF A NATIONAL CONCERN 
Saving, Investment, 
and Capital Shortages 
By MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM 
Director, Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington Univ., St. Louis, Mo. 
To meet the challenges of the future-they 
come upon us in the new year-our 
country needs an economic environment 
more conducive to private saving and 
investment, and economic policies and 
legislation that will bring it about 
Engineers usually understand the 
pivotal role of capital investment in 
providing the basis for the future 
standard of living-for increasing 
productivity and thus giving society 
an opportunity to dampen in-
flationary pressures as real income 
rises. Regrettably, a great many of 
our fellow citizens lack that 
economic sophistication, at least 
for the present. 
As an educator, I find it amusing 
when my students discover Maoist 
economists writing about the need 
to hold down consumption in the 
Chinese economy to free up the 
capital resources need to invest in 
the future growth of that economy. 
"Why, they are not even a 
capitalistic society," they will note 
in wonderment. Then the thought 
will sink in-sometimes with a little 
faculty assistance-that a rising 
stock of capital is necessary for any 
growing society, capitalistic (i.e., 
private enterprise or market-
oriented) or otherwise. It is really a 
basic matter of how much we want 
to eat, drink, and be merry today-
and how much we want to set aside 
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for the future. Boiled down to its 
fundamentals, assuring an ade-
quate flow of saving and investment 
is little more than demonstrating a 
proper concern for the future. 
But a more technical set of 
problems faces the serious student 
of what I call "capital adequacy" in 
the United States. Frankly, it is 
very awkward to talk about capital 
shortages at a time when so many 
American industries report excess 
capacity. After all, current manu-
facturing output is about one-fifth 
below the potential it could be at 
normal operating rates. It is no less 
awkward to urge reducing em-
phasis on consumption at a time 
when the average consumer has 
experienced a marked reduction in 
his or her real living standard. 
Despite the recovery to date, real 
consumer outlays per capita fall 
below what they were at the start of 
the recent recession. 
Moreover, at least one presti-
gious New York City fmancial 
institution deplores the very notion 
of capital shortages, noting that in 
every period the total flow of saving 
inevitably winds up equal to the 
amount of investment made. 
Meanwqile, a large Washington-
based research organization tells us 
that, for a very considerable future 
period, sufficient savings are likely · 
to be forthcoming to meet an-
ticipated investment requirements. 
Given the well nigh universal 
propensity of virtually every ele-
ment of the society to advocate 
cutting its taxes-and/or in-
creasing the expenditures devoted 
to the causes that it favors-should 
we not dismiss the continued pleas 
for national policies to foster more 
saving and i.t:ivestment as merely 
misguided or self-serving appeals 
on the part of higher-income 
segments of the population? 
Certainly, many will respond to 
that question with a loud and 
unequivocal "Yes." 
Those familiar with my views 
know that I believe that there are 
important reasons to be concerned 
about the future adequacy of saving 
and investment in the United 
States. Yet, in passing, I feel oblig-
ed to point out that the naivete and 
exaggeration on the part of some of 
the proponents of the capital-
shortage notion inevitably have 
triggered adverse reactions. 
In what follows, I take up four 
key aspects of capital fomation: 
First, a necessary distinction 
between short-term conditions and 
longer-term needs; second, a basic 
understanding of the process by 
which a sluggish potential flow of 
saving is made to equal what 
appears to be an excessively robust 
set of investment demands; third, 
an excursion into the never-never 
world of long-term economic 
forecasting; and fourth, the role of 
public policy, both in influencing 
the flow of saving and investment 
and in meeting other national 
priorities. 
Short-Term Glut Versus 
Long-Term Shortage? 
First, to clear the air, I would say 
that, as a general proposition, 
under most conceivable cir-
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cumstances, there will not be 
widespread shortages of productive 
capacity in the U.S. in the coming 
year or two. In effect, I am saying, 
let us not cry wolf. 
But by its very nature, capital 
investment is much more a matter 
of the future than of the present. If, 
for example, we are to meet the 
likely growth in power needs during 
the 1980s, this nation must make 
the necessary investments in new 
capacity today (some would have 
chosen yesterday). 
Capital investment surely is the 
prime example of that extended 
economic process where it is foolish 
to hold your fire until you see the 
whites of their eyes, or the green of 
the consumer's demand. 
Viewed in a more fundamental 
way, new investments of various 
kinds-physical capital, so-called 
human capital in the form of 
education and training and R&D-
provide the rising productivity and 
output which in turn fun-
damentally support sustainable 
increases in consumer living 
standards. 
To a very considerable extent, 
the economic policies to be followed 
in the coming year will be major 
determinants of the economy's 
ability to avoid widespread 
shortages, at least for the period 
until 1980. To the extent that 
monetary and ftscal policy will 
remain on the relatively modest 
course that has now been set, 
existing and planned increases in 
plant and equipment should 
generally be adequate to the 
economy's demands through most 
of the 1970s. To be sure, sporadic 
shortages of specific indus trial 
supplies are likely to arise from 
time to time, as they have in the 
past. After 1980 the prospects seem 
less optimistic, and will depend on 
the enactment of some of the 
specific proposals that I will 
present a little later. 
Should, however, the President 
and the Congress adopt a far more 
expansionary set of polici.es, then 
we might soon fmd the economy 
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pushing the limits of industrial 
capacity, particularly in such key 
sectors as steel. Allen Sinai and 
Roger Brinner have estimated the 
consequences of a more stimulating 
policy-one characterized by 
average annual growth rates of 9-
10% in the money supply and a 
fiscal policy eased by $15 billion of 
additional tax cuts in 1976. Under 
that alternative, they estimate a 
capital shortage by 1978, in both 
the financial and physical senses. 
Short- and long-term interest 
rates, under the "stimulation" 
scenario, would soar to double-digit 
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levels. The accompanying bot-
tlenecks in production would 
rapidly push prices up in 
chemicals, plastics, lumber, paper, 
textiles, metals, metal products, 
machinery, and transportation 
equipment. 1 
Those who scoff at the possibility 
of a capital shortage and simulta-
neously urge a more expansionary 
economic policy would seem to be 
plainly inconsistent in their 
analysis. 
Equating Saving and Investment 
Some economists, as well as 
others, seem to be offended by 
studies that show-for some future 
year-a yawning gap between the 
amount of saving that will be 
available and the amount of in-
vestment that will be desired. They 
note, quite properly, that we are 
dealing with an accounting 
identity. Unlike many of the 
speeches based on it, the often-
cited study by the New York Stock 
Exchange does clearly and properly 
distinguish between the gap that 
they show between forecasted 
saving and investment flows and 
the equality-at some level-of the 
actual saving and investment that 
will take place.2 
The equality between actual 
saving and actual investment 
resembles the equality, on business 
balance sheets, of assets and 
liabilities (including net worth). 
Yet, at the company level, we do 
not let that simple accounting 
identity inhibit serious analysis. We 
understand that the Assets = 
Liabilities relationship is true alike 
for bankrupt concerns as well as 
the most profitable corporations. 
Similarly, we need to remind 
ourselves that, for a national 
economy, Saving = Investment, 
both for a rapidly growing economy 
and a stagnant or even declining 
one. There are serious questions to 
be considered: At what level does 
balancing of saving and investment 
take place? What investment needs 
are rationed (or "crowded") QUt in 
the process? What types of in-
vestments are actually funded? 
As Henry W allich has pointed 
out, capital inadequacy can show 
up in various forms. First, it can 
manifest itself in bottleneck 
situations, with some industries not 
having enough capacity to serve 
their customers when the economy 
as a whole is operating at a high 
level. Second, an overall shortage of 
capital with respect to the labor 
force is possible, even if capacity is 
fairly evenly distributed among 
industries. Under such conditions, 
there would not be enough jobs to 
provide full employment even when 
industry is operating close to 
capacity.3 The joint concern of 
business and labor in increasing 
productivity capacity in such an 
event would be obvious. 
A more specialized defmition of 
capital shortage has been 
developed by Sinai and Brinner. 
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They use the term to refer to an 
economy which meets either of two 
conditions: 
1. The financial system fails to 
provide the necessary funds to 
fmance the economy's expenditures 
at reasonably stable rates of in-
terest. 
2. Capital expenditures are 
insufficient to generate enough 
capacity to meet the demands of 
the economy at reasonably stable 
prices. 
W allich contends that during peri-
ods in 1973 and 1974 the American 
economy experienced the two sets 
of symptoms of captial shortage 
that he describes. Sinai and 
Brinner warn us about the 
possibility of experiencing their two 
defmitions of capital shortages 
within the very next few years. 
The newer and smaller busi-
nesses, rather than the larger and 
better established companies, 
usually get crowded out of credit 
markets during periods of fmancial 
stringency. That should be of 
concern to all who favor a com-
petitive economy. And the available 
data are striking. Of the $6.4 
billion of bonds issued by the 
companies listed in the Fortune 
500, $5.1 billion was raised by the 
top 100 and $1.3 billion by the next 
400. The top 100 companies 
reported 28 bond issues in 197 4 and 
the bottom 100 only 1.4 
It is not my purpose to provide 
yet another set of computer runs of 
future capital supply and demand. 
But there are important reaso:ns to 
expect that saving in the years 
ahead will be weak by historical 
standards and investment needs 
and demands quite strong. 
On the supply side, several basic 
factors will be dampening down the 
potential for generating savings in 
the coming decade. In absolute 
terms, of course, there will be large 
increases in funds available for 
investment. Important forces, 
however, will be exercising a 
depressing effect on the growth rate 
of saving. Consumers, a basic 
source of savings in the economy, 
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will be experiencing some adverse 
factors. The changing age 
distribution of the United States 
population suggests that, if past 
savings patterns are maintained, 
the personal saving rate (although 
not the absolute amount) could 
decline over the coming decade. 
Just compare the anticipated 
trends in the low-saving age groups 
with the high-saving age brackets. 
That does not require much 
forecasting ability because we are 
talking about people who are 
already born and living in the U.S. 
The prospects are very unfavorable. 
The number of Americans in the 
high-spending, low-saving age 
brackets (20-34) will be rising 
substantially, from 46 million in 
1972 to 60 million in 1982. These 
are the young people who borrow 
heavily, particularly to finance and 
furnish new homes. Most of the 
people who shift from renting to 
buying a home are under 35. In 
striking contrast, the high-saving 
age brackets (40-54) will show a 
decline in absolute numbers, from 
36 in 1972 to 34 million in 1982. 
Another factor dampening down 
the private saving rate is the 
repeated 1iberalization of social 
security and other government 
welfare programs. This relationship 
has been noted by several scholars, 
liberal and conservative. Recent 
studies show that the provision of 
public pensions substantially 
depresses the rate of private 
saving. 5 With the Social Security 
system operating at best on a pay-
as-you-go basis, there is not off-
setting government saving. Should 
the system begin to operate at a 
deficit, there would be government 
dissaving. [Ed.-The Social 
Security Commission estimates a 
deficit of $3 billion this year and $6 
billion next.] 
I am going to skip over lightly the 
question of the adequacy of 
business saving, not because it is 
unimportant, but because others, 
notably George Terborgh, already 
have done such a thorough and 
convincing job of explaining how 
inflation has caused substantial 
overstatements of real business 
profits. especially as a result of 
inadequate depreciation allowances 
and transient inventory profits. 6 
Real corporate profits (adjusted for 
these factors) declined by over 40% 
in the past decade, from $37.0 bil-
lion in 1965 to $20.6 billion in 1974. 
On the demand side, in contrast, 
there clearly will be many rising 
needs for capital investment, both 
to meet new priorities, such as 
domestic energy reliance, and the 
requirements directly imposed on 
business by government. For 
example, both public and private 
projections show that rising annual 
dollar. outlays for new pollutio.n-
control facilities will be required to 
meet existing legal requirements. 
About 5% of industrial plant and 
equipment investments are ex-
pected to be devoted to these 
purposes. In addition, government-
mandated ind ustrial•safety and 
noise-abatement outlays will be 
significant, with estimates ranging 
to $40 billion or more during the 
coming five-year period. 7 These 
government-mandated investment 
requirements help to explain the 
anomaly of a declining return on 
capital, which is supposed to be a 
characteristic of a capital-surplus 
economy. It is evident that the 
typical firm realizes little if any 
return on these involuntary outlays. 
Thus a larger than average return is 
earned on the voluntary capital 
investments that are made. 
Economic Forecasting 
Intentionally or not, some 
economists seem to be competing 
for the role formerly played by the 
late Jack Benny-ftrst-rate dead-
pan comedian. I am referring to 
analysts who tell us, straight faced, 
that saving flows will be adequate 
to the investment fmancing task in 
the decade ahead, if only the 
Federal Government learns to 
operate at a surplus for an ex-
tended period of time-an even-
tuality as likely as my becoming 
young and handsome tomorrow. To 
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back that up, they cite several 
public and private forecasts that 
show that, by 1980 or some other 
future year, the Federal Govern-
ment may be operating at a sur-
plus, and thus adding to the 
availability of private capital funds. 
(For example, the President's 
January budget estimates a margin 
of $35 billion by which revenues 
would exceed outlays on a full-
employment basis in 1980.8 ) 
Do not be misled by these sta-
tistical exercises. I have done them 
myself and find them very useful-
as a form of mental gymnastics. 
The key to understanding these, as 
well as any other long-term 
forecasts, is to look at the un-
derlying assumptions. That is 
critical in this case. The key 
assumption, which may not always 
be apparent to the users of these 
forecasts, is that no further change 
will be made in the expenditure 
programs or revenue structure of 
the Federal Government. 
This is plainly unrealistic. If 
there is anything that can be 
forecast with confidence, it is that 
over the years the Congress will 
pass laws increasing the scope of 
existing programs and instituting 
new spending programs. Likely 
candidates are not hard to find, 
ranging from incentives to explore 
and develop new domestic energy 
sources to a national health-
insurance program. 
Do not interpret this as an attack 
on the projections per se, but on 
their use. They are not intended to 
be forecasts of reality. Rather, they 
are a useful input into the policy 
planning process. They indicate the 
amount of discretion available to 
increase outlays and/or cut taxes 
within the existing budget struc-
ture. In the future, as in the past, 
the public's appetite for new 
government services and benefits 
will likely outrun its willingness to 
pay for this largesse in the form of 
higher taxes. Thus, on balance, the 
Federal Government is likei, to run 
deficits and, on balance, to be not a 
supplier but an important user of 
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investment funds in years ahead. 
The Role of Publlc Polley 
Before considering possible 
changes in public policy, it is 
important to understand the 
impact of existing policies. We 
frequently hear that our current tax 
system is biased in favor of con-
sumption and against saving. If you 
have any doubt about the matter, I 
believe that you can resolve it 
quickly with a very simple and 
straightforward example. 
Consider three factory workers, 
A, B, C, each of the same age, the 
same work experience and size of 
family, and same compensation. To 
keep it simple, assume that each 
rents the house that he (or she) lives 
in. Mr. A regularly spends what he 
earns, no more and no less. Mr. B., 
a saver, deposits a portion of his 
paycheck into his savings account 
each week. Mr. C. not only spends 
everything he earns, but also 
borrows to the hilt, buying as much 
on credit as he can. 
The key question: Which of the 
three pays the most income tax and 
which pays the least? Clearly, Mr. 
B, the saver, will have the highest 
tax bill-paying taxes on his wages 
as well as on the interest that he 
earns on his savings account. Mr. C 
winds up with the lowest tax bill, as 
he receives a tax deduction for the 
interest he pays on his borrowings. 
Actual practice of course includes 
many variations in the tax treat-
ment of financial transactions. Yet, 
as a general principle, it does seem 
that, for the average citizen, the 
existing personal income tax 
structure favors consumption over 
saving. In addition, many of the 
government spending programs 
operate with a similar effect. 
Let us assume that A, B, and C 
all get laid off at the same time and 
none of them obtains ~ new job. 
Mr. C, the big spender, will be the 
first one who will be eligible to 
receive welfare, food stamps, and 
related benefits. Mr. A, the pay-as-
you-go man, will be next. The last 
to qualify for Federal assistance 
wiii be Mr. B, the big saver. Unlike 
the good Lord, the Peds do not 
seem to help those who help 
themselves. 
What can be done to provide 
greater encouragement to saving 
and investment? The first and 
perhaps most important idea that 
comes to mind is essentially a 
negative one. The Federal Govern-
ment should stop being such a large 
dissaver. That is, it should 
eliminate or at least reduce the 
massive extent to which it competes 
with the private sector for the 
relatively limited supply of -in-
vestment capital. As the economy 
continues to recover from its 
recession lows, the rising pace of 
business activity will yield in-
creasing flows of Federal revenues. 
Unless Congress increases 
government spending at the same 
rapid rate, the result will be a 
substantial reduction in the Federal 
deficit in 1977 and 1978. The result 
is not a foregone conclusion. The 
advocates of economy will have to 
exert sufficient political pressure to 
offset the proponents of greater 
government spending. 
There is a related question, 
which is far more technical, and 
hence for which there is little public 
support or even understanding. I 
am referring to the need to curtail 
the various off-budget agencies. 
These are mere subterfuges 
whereby normal Federal ex-
penditures do not show up in the 
budget. Not only do these ex-
penditures continue but, because 
they are no longer subject to the 
scrutiny of the budgetary process, 
they are expanding at a far more 
rapid rate. In Fiscal Year 1972, 
they totaled $249 miiiion. In the 
Fiscal Year 1976 budget they are 
estimated at over $10 billion. That 
is $10 billion that the Federal 
Government has to borrow above 
and beyond the official budget 
deficit. Should the proposal for an 
off-budget Energy Independence 
Agency be adopted, the size of this 
category would more than triple. 
It is with very great reluctance 
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that I call your attention to one 
specific off-budget agency, the 
Federal Financing Bank. Un-
fortunately, like so many govern-
ment activities, the Bank is per-
forming functions not intended by 
its original sponsors. It is also 
buying debt issued by private 
organizations and other institutions 
outside of the Federal Government 
in cases where those issues carry a 
government guarantee. That's just 
what we don't need-something 
that increases the Treasury's 
borrowing needs further still. The 
Congress should promptly repeal 
the authorization for the Federal 
Financing Bank to provide credit to 
private (non· F edera[) bo"owers. 
A second useful contribution 
that the Federal Government can 
make to ensure capital adequacy in 
the years ahead is in the area of 
government controls over business. 
An increasing number of regulatory 
agencies impose investment 
requirements on business ftrms-
stipulate investments which do not 
generate more productive capacity 
but are intended to meet various 
social priorities. I do not propose 
that all of these social requirements 
be eliminated, but rather that they 
be subject to the rigors of a 
benefit/cost test. These expensive 
Federal regulatory requirements 
should only be continued where it 
can be demonstrated that their 
value or benefit to the society 
exceeds the cost that they impose 
on the public. 
I must confess that I am far more 
enthusiastic about the desirability 
of these essentially negative ap-
proaches than I am about the 
various possibilities for providing 
positive incentives to saving and/ or 
investment. In a sense, my advice to 
the Congress is a variation of an old 
plea, "Don't just stand there, undo 
something." 
But now let me turn to those 
more positive possibilities. I see 
some important and useful lessons 
to be learned from the past. The 
more specific the focus of a Federal 
tax incentive, the more likely that 
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inefficiencies and other unwanted 
side-effects are going to result. At 
this point I certainly have no desire 
to add to the difficulties that the 
real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) are facing. But we do need 
to acknowledge that the situation 
was made possible by special-
interest tax legislation which 
permits the REITs-unlike most 
other corporations-to deduct the 
dividends they pay out from their 
taxable income. 
What is needed is true tax reform 
of general applicability. To a 
growing number of economists, 
both liberal and conservative, the 
most economically sensible and 
efficient approach to increasing 
private saving is to reduce the 
corporate income tax. That action 
would have a number of desirable 
effects. Clearly, a lower corporate 
income tax rate would increase 
after-tax corporate profits. That 
also should increase the amount of 
business ''saving" in the form of 
retained earnings. But not all of the 
tax reduction is likely to be saved. 
Some of the added profits would be 
disbursed in the form of higher 
dividends, and that increases in-
dividual disposable income and 
personal saving. To some extent, 
the tax saving may also be shifted-
forward to consumers in the form 
of lower prices, or rather more 
slowly rising prices, and backward 
to labor in the form of higher 
wages, salaries, and fringe benefits. 
The widespread nature of these 
resultant benefits are hardly cause 
for concern. Their precise 
distribution would depend on the 
operation of market forces. 
A lower corporate income tax 
rate would reduce the indirect but 
pervasive role of the tax collector in 
internal business decision-making. 
It would tend to promote more 
efficient use of resources to the 
extent that fewer low-priority busi-
ness expenses would be incurred 
merely because they are tax 
deductible. It would soften the 
double taxation of corporate in-
come. A lower corporate income 
tax would also reduce current bias 
in the tax system toward debt 
fmancing-because interest paid 
on debf is deductible from taxable 
income and in most cases dividends 
on equity capital are not. Rising 
debt/ equity ratios and declining 
interest coverages on corporate 
balance-sheets clearly demonstrate 
the importance of permitting a 
greater reliance on equity rather 
than on debt financing in the 
future. 
C. Lowell Harriss has also 
pointed out that the present cor-
porate income tax may contain 
some of the most regressive 
elements in the entire tax system. 
He has in mind the portion of the 
corporate income tax that reduces 
the income that would otherwise be 
available to such "capitalistic" 
shareholders as philanthropic insti-
tutions, foundations, universities, 
and employee pension funds. 
Harriss contrasts this with a tax at 
the personal level which can dif-
ferentiate among various categories 
of people on some rational or fair 
basis.9 
But, unlike the negative 
suggestions that I made earlier, I 
acknowledge that tax cuts would 
increase the Federal deficit and 
thus increase the amount of gov-
ernment borrowing that competes 
with private investment demands. 
Hopefully, the beneficial impacts 
on production and employment of a 
cut in corporate income taxes 
would generate "feedback" in the 
form of some significant com-
pensating increases in federal 
revenues. Unfortunately, in the 
past, most proposals for reducing 
the corporate income tax have been 
defeated by what may be termed 
demagogic appeals against 
reducing the tax burden on the 
"undeserving rich." 
Charles McLure of Rice Univ. 
states unequivocally, on the basis of 
his examination of the public 
fmance literature, that a separate 
tax on corporation income cannot 
be justified under commonly ac-
cepted canons of taxation. 1 0 
Astronautics & Aeronautics 
Tilford Gaines offered what may 
be the simplest and most effective 
response: "Of the many ap-
proaches that might be taken to 
lower unemployment rates per-
manently, i.e., to create more jobs, 
encouragement to capital in-
vestment must rank number 1."11 
Nevertheless, at least in the past, 
it has seemed easier to get far-less-
efficient special interest legislation 
into law. If the naive advocates of 
closing tax "loopholes" have their 
way, what we will see is the 
enactment of punitive legislation 
further reducing the incentive and 
ability of the private sector to save 
and invest. 
It is ironic that the pressures to 
increase capital-gains taxation, for 
example, are far stronger in the 
United States than in other in-
dustrialized nations, although our 
tax burden on such gains already is 
so much higher. In France, The 
Netherlands, and West Germany, 
for example, capital gains are 
generally exempt from income tax. 
If the Congress does take specific 
action in the corporate tax area, 
rather than "tightening" up on 
capital gains, it should give 
favorable consideration to con-
verting depreciation allowances to a 
true capital-recovery system. This 
of course could be done by shifting 
the depreciation base from histori-
cal cost to current replacement 
cost. Such forward-looking action 
would go a long way to halting the 
decline of real saving in the 
business sector of the private 
economy. 
The depreciation practices of 
other leading industrialized nations 
are in general far more liberal. 
Even including the effect of the 
investment credit and the ADR, 
only about 23.5% of a new in-
vestment in machinery and 
equipment can be written off in the 
frrst year under our Federal tax 
system, while France allows 31.3%, 
Japan allows 37.1, Canada, 50.0, 
and the United Kingdom atfull 100 
percent. 
Individual, consumer savings 
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could be encouraged through legis-
lation introduced by Senator Paul 
Fannin (S.4054) and Representative 
Jack Kemp (H.R. 7240 and H.R. 
7241). Senator Fannin's bill would 
exclude from gross income the frrst 
$1000 interest on deposits in 
savings institutions. Representative 
Kemp's proposal would provide a 
10% tax credit for the frrst $1000 of 
funds either deposited into a 
savings account or used to purchase 
the stock or bonds of a domestic 
corporation. It would also eliminate 
double taxation of common-stock 
dividends and lighten the tax load 
on capital gains. 
These are attractive proposals 
which would begin to move the 
Federal tax structure away from 
saving and investment so heavily 
and toward placing more of the 
burden on consumption. The 
timing of their enactment no doubt 
will be influenced strongly by the 
overall state of the Federal budget. 
Concluding Remarks 
The government's role as a 
competitor for and an allocator of 
investment funds in our economy 
needs to be restricted substantially. 
We also need greater public 
recognition that the government 
credit device does nothing to ex-
pand the volume of capital funds 
available to the economy. It in-
volves literally robbing Peter to pay 
(or lend to) Paul. But it is a game 
that government often likes to 
play-because it looks so painless 
to the taxpayer. More fun-
damentally, an economic en-
vironment needs to be created that 
promotes private saving and in-
vestment. 
Unless we as a nation act on 
many fronts to encourage private 
saving and to dampen down 
government competition for in-
vestment funds-a lower tax 
burden on saving, less deficit 
spending, and more realistic 
regulation-we must seriously 
consider the very real possibility 
that this nation will soon be en-
tering a period in which the un-
derlying demand for capital tends 
to outrun the supply of saving to 
fmance it. In practice, of course, 
available saving will be allocated 
one way or another among the 
various categories of investment 
requirements. But a high average 
level of interest rates is likely to be 
the balancing factor and numerous 
weaker demanders of capital-
notably small and new business, 
local governments, and in-
dividuals-will be elbowed out of 
fmancial markets and thus will 
obtain smaller real shares of the 
nation's resources. 
Hence, gearing public policy to 
encouraging an adequate flow of 
saving and investment does indeed 
show a proper concern for the 
future. 
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